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Godfrey Hove* 
 
Introduction 
 
The operation of marketing boards in colonial Africa has received significant 
scholarly attention. The commodity marketing boards that were established 
in West Africa have invited a great deal of historical inquiry, with scholars 
such as J.O. Ahazuem and T. Falola criticising them for their exploitative 
role as “tax-gatherers”1 for colonial governments. P.T. Bauer argues along 
more or less the same lines, contending that although the boards were 
ostensibly established to stabilise prices, this, in reality, was not the case 
because the boards turned out to be “instruments of robbery”, with farmers 
in both the Gold Coast and Nigeria consistently being paid prices well below 
the world market price.2 Prices actually became more unstable under the 
marketing board system than they had been prior to their formation. Instead 
of using the funds accumulated from the farmers to develop agriculture, 
scholars like A.G. Hopkins state that the funds were used for other projects 
largely unrelated to their origin.3 In this case, boards such as the West 
African Cocoa Control Board and the West African Control Board 
established in the Gold Coast in the 1940s served to exploit African 
producers to the advantage of the colonial state, and ultimately metropolitan 
Britain.  
 
For colonial Zimbabwe, most of the historiography on marketing 
boards, and agriculture in general, has focused on the maize, beef and 
tobacco industries, thus relegating other forms of agriculture to the fringes. I. 
Phimister and V. Kwashirai’s studies focus on the development of the beef 
industry under monopoly marketing companies and the role of the Imperial 
Cold Storage Company in the marketing of beef respectively.4 These two 
studies examine the circumstances leading to the development of 
monopolies in the beef industry as well as the underdevelopment of African 
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1.  J.O. Ahazuem and T. Falola, “Production for the Metropolis: Agriculture and Forest 
Products”, in T. Falola (ed.), Britain and Nigeria: Exploitation or Development 
(Longman, New York,1973), p84.  
2.  P.T. Bauer, quoted in A.G Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa 
(Longman, London, 1973), p 287. 
3.  Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, p 289. 
4.  See, V. Kwashirai, “The Operations of the Imperial Cold Storage and Supply 
Company in Southern Rhodesia, 1924–1938”, Hons dissertation, University of 
Zimbabwe, 1990; and I. Phimister, “Meat and Monopolies: Beef Cattle in Southern 
Rhodesia, 1890–1938”, Journal of African History,19, 3, 1978. 
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cattle production in the period prior to the Second World War. There are 
similar studies on maize production and marketing in Zimbabwe. E. 
Makombe has also written on the role of the Grain Marketing Board in the 
maize industry in colonial Zimbabwe. His work largely focuses on the pricing 
aspect and its impact on settler producers.5 He argues that the price policies 
pursued in Southern Rhodesia did not achieve the intended goal of 
stabilising production trends in the country. He also concludes that in the 
final analysis, the state did not offer settler producers “reasonable” price 
stability, despite efforts to rope African maize producers in to subsidise 
settler maize exports.6 M.C. Runhare’s study discusses the marketing of 
maize under the Grain Marketing Board in the Lalapanzi area between 1990 
and 2001.7 He focuses on the impact of the liberalisation of the marketing of 
maize in Zimbabwe and its impact on small-scale producers.  
 
While the historiographical bias towards maize, tobacco and beef may 
easily be rationalised by the fact that the three industries were the lynchpin 
around which the colonial economy rotated for much of the colonial period,8 
the success of other agricultural enterprises was vitally important for a 
colony whose ambition was to attain food self-sufficiency. Indeed, it is 
contended here that although they contributed less to the national income 
than did maize, tobacco and beef production, the “lesser” branches of 
agriculture provide an equally important lens through which some interesting 
dynamics of the Southern Rhodesian socio-economic and political 
developments can be viewed. The development of post- Second World War 
dairy farming under the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) illuminates some 
interesting facets of the anatomy of the Southern Rhodesian political 
economy. 
 
In examining the role played by the DMB in the production and, to a 
larger extent, marketing of milk, this article analyses the role played by the 
statutory bodies that were formed to deal with wartime and post-war 
shortages of agricultural products in Southern Rhodesia. These boards also 
endeavoured to re-organise product handling and distribution systems that 
were failing to cope with increased post-war production and consumption. 
The article argues that by taking over many struggling co-operative dairies 
and creameries and providing a guaranteed market for all milk and butterfat 
at fixed high prices, the DMB helped to stabilise and grow the industry. 
Indeed, production increased phenomenally, and by 1956, shortages had 
been eliminated. However, the paper also contends that the DMB later 
became a victim of its policy of using price incentives to induce farmers to 
                                                            
5.  E. Makombe, “Agricultural Commodity Pricing Policy in Colonial Zimbabwe with 
Particular Reference to the Settler Maize Industry: 1950–1980”, MA dissertation, 
University of Zimbabwe, 2002.  
6.  Makombe, “Agricultural Commodity Pricing”, p 61. 
7.  M.C. Runhare, “Post-Colonial Maize Marketing under Liberalization in Zimbabwe, 
1990–2001: A Cost-benefit Analysis with Particular Reference to Lalapanzi”, MA 
dissertation, University of Zimbabwe, 2002.  
8.  See, V. Machingaidze, “The Development of Settler Capitalist Agriculture in 
Southern Rhodesia with Particular Reference to the Role of the State, 1908–1939”, 
PhD thesis, University of London, 1980.  
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produce more, leading to serious viability woes from the late 1950s 
onwards.  
 
From about 1956, signs of milk over-production had begun to appear, 
and this ushered in a period of stress for farmers and the DMB. For 
producers, it led to falling prices because with the whole milk market 
saturated, more and more of the farmers’ milk was converted into less 
remunerative products such as cheese and skim milk powder and the 
government was unable to subsidise farmers under the difficult economic 
conditions of the time. For the DMB, conversion of surplus milk led to 
reduced profits (and losses in some cases), while efforts to find markets for 
the more lucrative whole milk business were unsuccessful. Whereas the 
commercial dairy sector had depended on the growing settler population for 
consumption after the war, a steady decline in the settler immigration rate 
from the 1960s onwards, coupled with a burgeoning African urban presence 
as a result of the post-war industrial boom, meant that the exploration and 
development of the African urban population as a potential market for both 
agricultural and industrial products became an increasingly inevitable 
economic necessity. It will be argued that more than any other reason, the 
vigorous pursuit of the African market and the elimination of competitors 
(particularly producer-retailers who marketed their milk in urban centres 
from the late 1950s), led to the government’s efforts to ensure the DMB’s 
profitability in the wake of the hostile economic conditions that began in the 
1960s and stretched into the 1970s.  
 
Post-World War Two developments 
 
The advent of the Second World War in 1939 radically altered the disposal 
pattern, if not the entire structural organisation of the dairy industry. 
Whereas dairymen had long depended on the export trade for the disposal 
of their products, the rapid increase in white population during and after the 
war years led to a corresponding increase in the local demand for dairy 
products. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, a number of military centres 
were established in the main centres of the country. Royal Air Force training 
centres sprang up in Salisbury, Bulawayo and Gwelo, and these were 
responsible for the arrival of about 20 000 Royal Air Force personnel, their 
wives and families into the country. In addition, at least 6 000 internees and 
refugees had settled in Southern Rhodesia by 1945.9 Consequently, 
considerable quantities of milk which would normally have been converted 
into butter and cheese for export had to be diverted to the local fresh milk 
trade. In fact, a shortfall between production and consumption of dairy 
products, particularly butter and milk had begun to emerge by 1942. 
Because the country was, for the first time, failing to satisfy local demand, it 
was faced with a need to import butter and cheese as virtually all milk was 
sold on the fresh milk market. However, the war itself made importing very 
difficult due to wartime disturbances and restrictions, and it became clear to 
                                                            
9.  J. Ngadze, “The Development of Commercial Dairying in Southern Rhodesia in an 
International Perspective: An Experience of a Late-comer”, Hons dissertation, 
University of Zimbabwe, 1985, p 46. 
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the Dairy Control Board, which had been formed in 1931 in response to the 
depression-induced hardships, that the only viable option was to increase 
production and become self-sufficient. 
 
The accelerated rate of white immigration after the Second World War 
exerted greater pressure on the dairy industry. Some of the white 
immigrants were former British soldiers who were attracted by the incentives 
offered by the government’s post-war settlement scheme, while some were 
former trainees under the Royal Air Force training scheme who decided to 
settle in the country permanently.10 Also, a great number of white 
immigrants were fleeing the harsh post-war economic conditions in Britain 
and were optimistic of better prospects in a country whose policies were 
heavily biased in favour of white settlers.11 
 
This placed great strain upon the dairy industry, and an acute problem 
in catering for the future milk requirements of the rapidly expanding 
European population was inevitable. This problem arose partly because of 
the low prices that were offered to producers, and largely as a result of the 
nature of the milk distribution system that existed in the country. In response 
to the low producer prices that had perennially been paid to farmers since 
the onset of the Great Depression, under the Dairy Act of 1937 the Dairy 
Industry Control Board was empowered to fix minimum and maximum prices 
to be paid to producers. Further, in efforts to stimulate production in the face 
of shortages induced by the Second World War,  the Dairy Control Board in 
1943 established a price equalisation scheme, and followed this up with a 
dairy bonus scheme in 1945 whose aims were to “encourage winter 
production by a substantially increased price for butterfat and milk produced 
during this period” and to encourage the production of good quality milk and 
butterfat by offering bonuses for first grade butterfat respectively. Although 
producer prices became somewhat higher owing to these schemes, the fact 
that they were merely short term remedies meant that few prospective dairy 
farmers were prepared to make long term investments in the industry. The 
schemes had the effect of inducing existing farmers to increase production, 
thus leading to nominal milk and butterfat production increases. 
 
On the distribution side, overall responsibility for production patterns 
and marketing arrangements was placed in the hands of the government 
through the Minister of Lands and Agriculture, while the role of municipal 
authorities was limited only to milk produced in their areas of jurisdiction.12 
However, virtually all creameries and dairies that received, processed and 
distributed milk and other milk related products were run by farmer-owned 
co-operative concerns. Owing to limited capital, and the generally low profit 
margins they had worked with since the late 1920s,13 their milk handling 
                                                            
10.  A.S. Mlambo, “From Second World War to UDI, 1940–1965”, in B. Raftopoulos 
and A.S. Mlambo (eds), Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial 
Period to 2008 (Weaver Press, Harare, 2009), p 80. 
11.  Mlambo, “From Second World War to UDI”, p 45. 
12.  Ngadze, “The Development of Commercial Dairying”, p 47. 
13.  As in most agricultural industries in Southern Rhodesia at this time, retail prices of 
milk and butter were controlled by the government. 
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facilities, which could only be improved piecemeal during the war owing to 
scarce equipment and supplies, were inadequate to handle larger volumes 
of milk that had been anticipated for post-War Southern Rhodesia. 
 
In response to their limited handling capacity, the co-operative 
enterprises had, by 1952, developed monopolistic tendencies in that the 
entry of new producers into the liquid milk market was made difficult by a 
whole milk quota system.14 In this case, new supplies could only gain entry 
after sales had increased, rather than in anticipation of growth.15 The quota 
system had the effect of barring new entrants into the industry, while 
existing producers were discouraged from expanding production. In these 
conditions, fresh milk tended to be in short supply. Given the fast increasing 
population and the demand for milk and other dairy products, something 
had to be done urgently to redress the situation.16 
 
In an effort to resolve the problem, two official inquiries were 
conducted – the Milk Subsidy Committee in 194717 and a Parliamentary 
Select Committee in 194918 – from which an entirely new organisational 
structure was conceived. With a projected European population growth to 
almost 200 000 by 1956 in mind, the two committees recommended the 
establishment of a statutory milk commission which would initially 
concentrate on securing milk for the large cities where needs were most 
pressing, and thereafter, with government finance, would expropriate and 
compensate existing milk handling enterprises. It would also build new 
factories and processing plants where necessary. It also advocated a long-
term producer price policy with payment according to the quality of milk 
produced.19 By and large, most of these recommendations were adopted, 
and a non-statutory Milk Marketing Committee was established in 1949. It 
was charged with buying milk direct from the producers and selling it to 
distributors. In the buoyant economic conditions of the time, Land Bank 
loans were made available to intending dairymen so that a material 
improvement in raw milk supplies was almost inevitable. Indeed, this led to a 
material increase in raw milk supplies, output rising by over 3 million gallons 
to 10.1 million gallons in 1951 from 7.2 million in 1946.20 
 
                                                            
14.  Under a quota system, a maximum amount of milk could be delivered to the Board, 
while new farmers were only allowed to enter the business on an even lower 
quota. 
15.  R.G. Jones, “The Dairy Scene in Rhodesia”, Rhodesian Agricultural Journal, 1, 2, 
14 July, 1952, p 12. 
16.  See M. Rukuni, “The Evolution of Agricultural Policy: 1890–1990”, in M. Rukuni, P. 
Tawonezvi, C.K. Eicher, M. Munyuki-Hungwe and P. Matondi (eds), Zimbabwe’s 
Agricultural Revolution Revisited (University of Zimbabwe Publications,  Harare, 
2006), p 24. 
17.  National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ), S1215/1366/5, Southern 
Rhodesia, Milk Subsidy Committee Report: Re-organization of the Fresh Milk 
Trade, 1947, p 46. 
18.  NAZ, S1215/1366/6, Southern Rhodesia, Report of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on the Dairy Industry, 1949, p 5. 
19.  NAZ, S1215/1366/5, Southern Rhodesia, Milk Subsidy Committee Report: Re-
organisation of the Fresh Milk Trade, 1947, p 46. 
20.  NAZ, FG4, Report of the 1961 Commission of Inquiry into the Dairy Industry, p 10. 
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As more milk and butter were delivered to them by farmers, the ability 
of co-operative dairies to handle, process and distribute milk and other 
products was severely strained. Disruptions which continued to occur in the 
handling and distribution, coupled with seasonal milk shortages which 
persisted in most centres, seemed to point to a complete distribution 
breakdown.21 Partly as a result of the wartime hardships, and mainly due to 
long term shortages of capital, the processing plants of most creameries 
and co-operative dairies were either too old to function properly or generally 
too small to accommodate increasing milk intake, or both. 
 
In response to the marketing problems, which at this time affected 
virtually every agricultural industry in Southern Rhodesia, in 1951 the 
government passed the Agricultural Marketing Act, providing for the 
establishment of marketing schemes to regulate the marketing of 
agricultural products. This Act gave birth to the Agricultural Marketing 
Council (AMC) whose main duty was to examine and advise the Minister of 
Agriculture and Lands on issues to do with pricing, import and export of 
agricultural products and the formation of marketing schemes for all 
agricultural sectors.22 It was within this framework that the Dairy Marketing 
Scheme was created and introduced with effect from the first day of October 
1952. Under this scheme, the Dairy Marketing Board was formed on the 
same day, hence abolishing the Dairy Control Board.23 The DMB was 
empowered to purchase all manner of dairy products, to process, distribute 
and import them, as well as to erect and operate dairy plants in Southern 
Rhodesia.  
 
Revival and stabilisation: Production and marketing trends under the 
Dairy Marketing Board to 1956 
 
When the DMB began operations, most dairies and creameries were 
evidently struggling to stay afloat. In its 1953/54 report, the Board noted that 
most of the producers’ co-operative companies were in “a parlous state, all 
except one were losing money and lacked capital for necessary 
improvement”.24 The only exception was the Model Dairy in Bulawayo which 
had undergone refurbishment in 1948. With the government controlling the 
consumer prices of dairy products, the co-operative companies could not 
raise adequate resources from their businesses to re-capitalise their 
operations and cater for the increasing supplies of milk. Thus, it was partly 
because of their limited capacity that they adopted a “closed shop” attitude 
towards new entrants into the industry. Shortly after the DMB’s 
establishment, the Dairymen’s Co-operative, which had been servicing 
Salisbury, gave notice to go into liquidation. The Board took over its 
operations, and hence immediately became involved in the retailing of milk 
and other dairy products.25 Although the DMB had initially sought to use 
private enterprise in large centres as its agents in the distribution of milk, it 
                                                            
21.  Ngadze, “The Development of Commercial Dairying”, p 14. 
22.   Ngadze, “The Development of Commercial Dairying”, p 14. 
23.  NAZ, FG4, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Dairy Industry, 1961, p 12. 
24.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB Annual Report, 1953/1954. 
25.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1953/1954. 
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quickly learnt that this was not possible at this stage.26 The margin allowed 
proved very unattractive to private enterprise and this forced the Board to 
organise its own distribution. Indeed, during the debate on the motion to 
approve the marketing scheme in the colony’s parliament in 1952, the 
Minister of Agriculture and Lands claimed that the handling of milk on a 
retail basis was “forced” on the DMB by the Dairymen’s Co-op going into 
liquidation, and that “it was not intended that it should be one of its 
functions. Already the Board is considering the question of ridding itself of 
the distribution in this centre.”27 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, however, it may be said that the DMB 
made few, if any attempts to rid itself of distribution. Actually, it did the 
opposite. As more dairies in other centres “availed themselves” for 
liquidation, the Board successfully appealed to the government for the 
release of funds to enable it to purchase more dairies and take over their 
operations. The DMB was convinced that the best way to establish the 
industry on a more solid footing was by taking over the dairies, creameries 
and factories and re-capitalising them. Writing in 1953, the chairman of the 
DMB, T.C. Pascoe argued: 
 
It has already become apparent that the industry cannot be operated at 
maximum efficiency in the interest of the consumers and producers alike, 
until the Board assumes direct control of the processing of milk, butter and 
cheese throughout the colony. Only by this means can it satisfactorily 
rationalise the industry … there are indications that the independent 
producer co-operatives would not be unwilling to see their activities taken 
over … so that the whole industry can be operated as one single economic 
unit.28 
 
This argument makes sense only if it is taken to mean that all 
struggling co-operative companies that voluntarily went into liquidation 
should be purchased and taken over by the DMB in the interest of 
producers and consumers. Given the unprofitable nature of their operations, 
most co-operative companies were indeed prepared to hand themselves 
over to the Board for a fee at the time, and many did. However, also 
unmistakable from Pascoe’s statement is the underlying inference that that 
the Board should be the only player in the industry. As will be shown later in 
this article, this posture gradually developed into a policy of active 
involvement by the Board from the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. 
From its early days, therefore, the DMB became the chief distributor of milk 
in the main centres, with the remainder being distributed by producer-
retailers who took advantage of their geographical location to enter into the 
retail trade in the major centres.29 By 1960, the only remaining private dairy 
processing enterprises operational which pre-date the DMB were the small 
co-operative cheese factory at Chipinga; a private butter factory at Umtali; 
and a small proprietary dairy at Fort Victoria which operated as an agent of 
                                                            
26.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1953/1954. 
27.  NAZ, S/114/3456, Southern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly Debates, 25 
May1953. 
28.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1952/1953. 
29.   NAZ, FG 4, Report of the 1961 Commission of Inquiry, p 6. 
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the DMB for the distribution of milk. In total, the Board expended about £578 
000 on the purchase of the co-operative businesses, which finance was 
provided by the government in the form of long-term loans.30 
 
The takeover of many of the struggling dairy processing enterprises 
had the effect of reviving the interest of prospective dairymen. Most settlers 
who had intended to engage in dairy farming prior to these developments 
had been frustrated by the “closed shop” attitude of the co-operatives which 
manifested itself in a quota system being introduced for new producers.31 
When the Board took over these dairies, it abolished this system because 
constitutionally it was obliged to accept all the milk that was delivered to it. It 
is not surprising therefore, that many of the interested settler farmers, who 
had been closed out by the parochial approach of the co-operatives, joined 
the industry after 1952. While there were only 359 registered whole milk 
producers in Southern Rhodesia in 1952, this number had risen to 526 by 
1957.32 Without doubt, the availability of a guaranteed market for milk and 
butter lured some formerly hesitant settlers into dairying. It also gave the 
existing farmers the much needed confidence to increase production. They 
had the assurance of a market for all their milk and butterfat. 
  
After taking over most of the dairy processing enterprises from private 
co-operatives, it soon became apparent to the Dairy Marketing Board that 
their processing facilities were wholly inadequate to cater for the growing 
volume of milk received. Most co-operatives had inadequate resources to 
modernise their facilities, particularly because the cost of a dairy plant is 
probably higher, in relation to the returns on capital, than in almost any other 
agricultural industry. The Board thus had to embark on a major expansion 
and modernisation drive in virtually all the dairies it purchased. In Salisbury 
(now Harare), for example, which received the highest average daily intake 
of milk, the Board had inherited a dilapidated dairy. Unsuccessful efforts by 
the Dairymen’s Co-op to refurbish the dairy led to a scenario where the 
Board had to take over a partially completed facility which needed a major 
facelift. In his outline of the problems at the Salisbury dairy, W. Sandford, 
the Board’s first chairman, complained: 
 
Although the Board was able to commence the processing of whole milk in 
the Manica Road Dairy on the 1st of December 1952, the installation of the 
plant and the alterations to the building were by no means complete. 
Considerable trouble was experienced with the bottle washing machine 
which was damaged by a subsidence of the conditions and there was further 
trouble with the refrigerating plant due to inexperienced workmanship in the 
installation.33 
 
                                                            
30.   NAZ, FG 4, Report of the 1961 Commission of Inquiry, p 6. 
31.  Under this system, dairies and creameries accepted a limited amount of milk from 
new producers owing to the limited storage and handling capacity at most of their 
facilities. Although a quota was also in place for existing producers, this was much 
higher than the one imposed on new producers.   
32.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1956/1957, p 11. 
33.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1953/1954, p 15. 
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The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the cheese 
factory had long broken down so that the Board had to make makeshift 
arrangements for the manufacture of cheese which was done in the ice 
cream section of the dairy.34 The cheese section was only resuscitated in 
February 1953 at a time when the summer “flush” season was almost 
coming to an end and when less milk had to be converted into cheese. 
However, despite the massive additions and buildings that were made, it 
was apparent that the Salisbury dairy, given the ever increasing volume of 
milk that was delivered to it, would still be inadequate to meet whole milk 
requirements in the near future. The Board consequently applied to the 
Salisbury municipality for a more conducive site which would facilitate the 
establishment of an improved and much larger facility for the handling of 
whole milk and the manufacture of other dairy products. However, due to 
the rigorous bureaucratic procedures that the Board had to follow in 
acquiring the land from the local authority and the requisite funds from the 
government, the new Salisbury dairy was only commissioned in February 
1959.35 By this time, the dairy could barely handle the milk delivered 
comfortably, with the result that the quality of milk deteriorated at the dairy, 
particularly during the summer. 
 
It was thus evident that the other dairies which the Board had taken 
over from the Rhodesia Co-operative creameries in Gwelo, Que Que and 
Umtali were hardly suitable for use in the interest of both the consumers and 
the producers. In July 1953 the Board had the advice of R. Dibsdale, an 
engineer of the Aluminium & Vessel Company, who undertook a survey of 
the colony’s dairy processing plants and submitted a report on its 
requirements for the next ten to fifteen years. Dibsdale recommended that 
inter-alia, the Gwelo and Umtali dairies could only be regarded as makeshift 
until entirely new dairies are constructed.36 In addition, he noted that the 
Que Que dairy, although relatively better than those at Gwelo and Umtali, 
was too antiquated for the present circumstances and needed 
refurbishment. So dire was the situation at these dairies that the Board was 
at times forced to transfer milk to the already overburdened Salisbury dairy 
during the flush seasons, only for the milk to be sent back during times of 
shortages.  
 
In fact, private dairies also came to the rescue of the Board’s dairies 
by accepting their milk for processing. For instance, the Model Dairy in 
Bulawayo (before it was taken over by the Board) accepted milk from the 
dairy in Gwelo and the Bulawayo Creamery and converted this milk into 
cheese for sale to the public.37 However, being a private concern, it could 
hardly be expected to assist the Board if this assistance were to lead to 
losses for the company. For example, during the 1953/54 milk flush 
season,38 this dairy was unable to accept the surplus milk normally sent to it 
                                                            
34.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1953/1954, p 15. 
35.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1958/1959, p 12. 
36.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1958/1959, p 12. 
37.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report and Accounts, 1954/1955, p 9. 
38.  The dairy seasons, generally speaking, are divided into two: winter, when pastures 
are poor and milk production is low; and the summer season when due to 
128
Milk (over)production in Colonial Zimbabwe 
 
128 
 
from Gwelo because of the very small margin allowed for manufacturing 
cheese. These supplies were sent to the Salisbury dairy instead, despite the 
fact that the Salisbury dairy was already receiving qualities of milk far in 
excess of its capacity.39 
 
Owing to the parlous state of the dairies, plans were therefore drawn 
up by the Dairy Marketing Board for a new dairy, creamery and cheese 
factory at Gwelo; and a new dairy and cheese factory at Umtali. A 
satisfactory five-acre site was secured from the Cold Storage Commission in 
Gwelo, while the Umtali local authority sold a suitable piece of land to the 
Board for the construction of the facilities. The construction of the two 
dairies was completed in 1955 at a combined cost of £155 000.40 A new 
dairy plant was also installed at Que Que during the year with the result that 
the existing plant had to be closed down completely for about six months 
while the new facility was being installed. During this period, bottled milk had 
to be transferred from Gwelo each morning, the lorry returning to Gwelo with 
the bulk milk which producers in the Que Que catchment area delivered. 
Inevitably, this led to huge financial losses; so much that the Gwelo and 
Que Que dairies incurred a combined loss of £4 132 in that year.41  
 
The new Gwelo dairy subsequently became the largest in the country 
during the 1950s – it was able to bottle up to 3 000 gallons of milk per day 
and could also convert 1 000 gallons of milk into cheese and the equivalent 
of 22 000 gallons of milk could be converted into butter and skim milk 
powder in a day.42 In fact, the dairy became the de facto headquarter of milk 
products, since both the Salisbury and Bulawayo dairies began to send 
surplus milk there for conversion into butter and skim milk from 1955 
onwards.  
 
Without doubt, these capital projects went a long way towards 
modernising the processing and equitable distribution of milk and other dairy 
products. Indeed, a Commission of Inquiry set up in 1961 to investigate the 
dairy industry, reported in 1962 that it was “impressed with the plants, which 
are first-rate, and [with] the spotless way everything was built”.43 These 
developments also played an important role in boosting the confidence of 
the producers in the future of the industry. 
 
Prices 
 
Dairying, being a long-term project, needs stability of producer prices if the 
confidence of producers is to be assured. It is not necessarily important that 
the price should always be high, providing it does not fluctuate too much 
and thereby affect the confidence of producers. Given the high incidence of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
improved pastures, cows produce more milk. The latter season, when milk and 
butterfat are in abundance, is referred to as the “flush” season. 
39.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1954/1955, p 9. 
40.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1954/1955, p 9.   
41.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1954/1955, p 9. 
42.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB Annual Report, 1954/1955, p 9.  
43.  NAZ, FG 4, Report of the 1961 Commission of Inquiry, p 29. 
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shortages of milk and milk products in Southern Rhodesia when the DMB 
was formed, it was necessary that steps be taken to incentivise milk and 
butterfat production and thus boost producer confidence. At the same time, 
the government was anxious to keep the consumer prices of whole milk and 
other products (such as cheese, butter and skim milk powder) low. In fact, 
the government sought to maintain the cost of living as low as possible to 
attract white settlement in the aftermath of the Second World War. In 
addition to providing farmers with an assured market in the form of the DMB, 
the government took steps to ensure that producer prices were fixed at an 
attractive level during the early years of the Board’s operation. The Board 
had little say in the determination of the prices it paid to the producers; they 
were negotiated from time to time between the government (as advised by 
the Agricultural Marketing Council), and the Rhodesian National Farmers’ 
Union (RNFU).44 
 
The pricing of milk to products was not uniform throughout the year. In 
line with standard international practice in the major dairying countries, the 
government continued the system of paying higher prices during the winter 
season in order to encourage production during that time. For the 
1952/1953 season, for instance, the Board paid 2/6d per gallon in summer 
and this went up to 3/9d per gallon in winter.45 These prices, which were 
fixed with a view to increase producer confidence, were negotiated on an 
annual basis. However, there were very few fluctuations to the price paid to 
producers until 1957. This was despite the fact that prices on the 
international market were highly volatile throughout the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
It is also important to note that the prices paid to farmers during this 
time were slightly higher in comparison to what farmers elsewhere were 
earning. For instance, the New Zealand dairymen, who were generally more 
efficient compared to their Southern Rhodesian counterparts, were paid an 
average of 3/5d per gallon during the July to November winter in 1953, while 
dairy farmers in the Union of South Africa received 3/4d per gallon during 
the same season of the year.46 This is a clear indication that in the 1950s 
the Southern Rhodesian government was determined to go out of its way to 
encourage production. Although the dairy industry during that time was not 
as lucrative as any of the three major agricultural sectors, that is, tobacco, 
maize and beef, the price incentive offered was still attractive enough to 
entice some of the immigrant settlers to embark on dairying. In addition, the 
farmers who had already invested in dairying were encouraged to increase 
the extent of their investments because of the high producer prices. The 
result was that the number of dairy farmers in the colony more than doubled 
between 1952 and 1961. Shortages, which had characterised the 1940s, 
were eliminated by the end of 1954, and by 1956 a significant surplus was 
beginning to be witnessed, even during the winter seasons.47 Production 
targets and estimates in the 1950s were easily surpassed within shorter 
                                                            
44.  Mokombe, “Agricultural Commodity Pricing”, p 38.  
45.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1952/1953, p 3. 
46.  W.M. Drummond, “Price Raising in the Dairy Industry”, in The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Practical Science, 16, 1964, p 91.   
47.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1956/1957, p 3. 
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periods of time. In the Board’s second annual report in 1954, for example, it 
was estimated that 8 300 000 gallons of milk would be handled by the 
Board’s dairies in 1956, whereas actual receipts for that year were 9 530 
000.48 Whereas the Salisbury dairy handled an average of 8 200 gallons of 
milk per day in 1953/54, it was handling an average of about 13 700 gallons 
per day during 1956/57.  
 
Increasing milk production levels over and above national whole milk 
requirements meant that a bigger proportion of milk had to be processed 
into cheese and skim milk. For instance, while only 14.7% of the  6.11 
million gallons delivered to the Board were converted into cheese and skim 
milk during the 1953/44 season, about 31.5% of the 9.53 gallons delivered 
to the Board were processed into cheese and skim milk in 1956/57.49 
Initially, this was not difficult for the Board because of its enlarged and 
improved cheese making facilities particularly at its Gwelo, Salisbury and 
Umtali dairies. In fact, the gallonage of milk that was set aside for cheese 
manufacture was always on the rise during the period to 1957. This can be 
illustrated by the fact that while only 1 397 857 gallons were used in the 
manufacture of cheese in 1955, about 2 266 900 gallons were devoted to 
cheese manufacture by 1957.50  
 
The conversion of an increasing proportion of milk into cheese 
became crucial in reducing the import burden of the Board. Prior to 1955, 
Southern Rhodesia had to import large quantities of cheese from South 
Africa and Kenya in an attempt to supplement the shortages on the local 
market. As a result of the conversion of large quantities of milk into cheese, 
particularly during the flush season, and the improved cheese making 
facilities, the Board was able to manufacture sufficient quantities of Cheddar 
and Gouda cheese for the home market without the necessity to import.51 
The level of cheese production in the country was also boosted by the 
Gazaland co-operative cheese factories in Chipinga, which was the only 
private concern in the cheese making business at the time. 
 
With time, however, the Board was compelled to manufacture more 
cheese than it could reasonably expect to dispose of. This was despite the 
fact that cheese sales were growing at a steady rate within the colony. Two 
factors account for this. Firstly, the ever increasing intake of milk from 
producers over and above whole milk requirements pushed the Board to 
convert more milk into cheese despite its knowledge of the inelasticity of the 
market for this product. The substantial rise in milk deliveries (which milk the 
Board was obliged to accept) particularly during the 1956/57 flush season, 
strained the Board’s milk storage facilities so much that it just converted it 
into cheese without due regard for the limited market for cheese. It should 
be noted, however, that this occurred only during flush seasons when the 
amount of milk delivered to the Board was at a peak. Secondly, the margin 
which cheese retailers were allowed was too low. This meant that many 
                                                            
48  NAZ, S/DA 57, AMC/ DBM, Annual Report, 1956/1957, p 7. 
49.  NAZ, S/DA 57, AMC/ DBM, Annual Report 1956/1957, p 7.  
50.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report 1956/1957, p 7.   
51.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report 1956/1957, p 7.   
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retailers were dissuaded from purchasing cheese from the Board; they 
preferred instead to sell imported cheese because its wholesale price was 
not subject to local price control. In terms of price control regulations, 
retailers only received a small margin of 4d per lb on locally produced 
cheese.52 The result of this, of course, was that Southern Rhodesia 
continued to import cheese even during the flush seasons when her local 
production was sufficient to meet domestic needs.  
 
The overall effect of increased cheese manufacture, especially during 
the flush season, against the background of a limited local market was that 
huge stocks of cheese were piled up at most DMB dairies. T.C. Pascoe’s 
comment on this issue at the end of the 1955/56 year illustrates the 
situation. He said: 
 
Although it was possible to convert most of the surplus [milk] into cheese, 
there was approximately a five month stock of cheese in the Colony at the 
end of the period which resulted in available facilities being taxed to the 
utmost. In Que Que, this necessitated renting extra storage space.53 
 
Owing to its keeping qualities, that is, the time frame within which the 
cheese would retain its freshness, most of the cheese deteriorated in quality 
as it lay stockpiled at the dairies. Despite strenuous efforts to dispose of 
surplus cheese by increasing exports to South Africa and Northern 
Rhodesia,54 older cheese developed internal mould which resulted in slightly 
reduced price realisation to the Board.131 There were, however, sporadic 
shortages of cheese in winter at some dairies in Bulawayo and Fort Victoria, 
and it was during this time that the Board either attempted to dispose of the 
deteriorated stocks or resorted to importing. It thus became an annual 
pattern to export surplus stocks in April or May of each year and to import 
any shortfall each October.55 
 
A more serious problem with cheese production, however, was the 
low profit realisation it afforded the Board itself. With both wholesale and 
retail cheese prices controlled by the government, the Board found itself 
making losses through the manufacture of cheese. In fact, so narrow were 
the margins allowed that the Board itself was selling first grade cheese to 
retailers at about cost, while second and third grade butter was sold at a 
definite loss.56 This low profit realisation by the Board was further 
aggravated by the fact that the DMB at times sold old cheese whose quality 
had deteriorated; and that retailers were unwilling to purchase the Board’s 
cheese, even the higher grade product, preferring, as mentioned above, to 
trade in imported cheese because its wholesale price was not subject to 
local price control. 
  
                                                            
52.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1956/1957, p 7.  
53.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1955/1956, p 12.  
54.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1955/1956, p 12. 
55.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1955/1956, p 12. 
56.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1955/1956, p 13. 
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It was in this light that the Board turned to whole milk and skim milk 
(both liquid and powder) in an attempt to improve its financial standing. The 
manufacture of skim milk was done particularly with the urban Africans in 
mind. The words of T.C Pascoe in 1956 serve to shed light on to the official 
thinking at the time. He stated that: 
 
The Board is determined to convert the African into a milk consumer, not 
only to assist in utilising the ever increasing milk surplus, but also to improve 
the general health of this section of the population. For some time to come, 
this aim can best be achieved by making wholesome skim milk, rather than 
whole milk, readily available to the African at a price which he can afford.57 
 
While it may be true that as Pascoe’s statement above shows, the 
Board was also concerned about improving the diet and general health of 
urban Africans, it may also be contended that the Board’s primary concern 
was finding outlets for its surplus milk. As will be illustrated later in this 
article, the fast rising African urban population was just one of the many 
outlets the increasingly desperate Board looked to as a potential market for 
liquid milk. 
 
With a view to increasing sales and luring Africans into buying its 
dairy products, in 1956 the Board decided to sell liquid skim milk and 
cultured lactic milk, which was popularly referred to as “lacto”, at sub-
economic prices. With time, however, when consumers seemed to have 
“accepted” the products, the prices were raised to more economic levels in 
1957.58 Although sales of both liquid skim milk and “lacto” decreased slightly 
following price increases from 4d per pint to 4.5d per pint, they began to 
show a tendency to increase during the ensuing years as Africans began to 
“adjust” to the prices. After all, the prices were still far lower than that of 
whole milk whose price was pegged at 6d per pint for sales in quantities of 
less than 3 gallons at a time.59 
 
In February 1956, the DMB purchased two second hand units for the 
purpose of converting part of the surplus milk into skimmed milk powder. 
These units, which were installed at the dairy in Gwelo, began production 
the following month. As with liquid skim milk and “lacto”, the target market 
for skim milk largely comprised but was not restricted to urban Africans. A 
report by independent analysts concerning the quality of the product stated 
that it “compare[d] favourably with imported roller dried skimmed milk 
powder”.60 This product, which the analysts described as being of the 
“utmost value for the African diet from a nutritional aspect”, was marketed 
throughout the colony at a price considerably lower than the price of whole 
milk in one pint packets.61 In addition to African consumption, however, 
skimmed milk powder was also marketed to dairy farmers and beef cattle 
ranches in bags for use as stock feed. As part of efforts to help dairy 
                                                            
57.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1955/1956, p 13. 
58.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1957/1958, p 15. 
59.  NAZ, S/DA 57, D.M.B  Annual Report,  1957/1958, pp15. 
60.  NAZ, F/1271/F68, Dairy Industry Economic Inquiry, September 1961, p 3. 
61.  NAZ, F/1271/F68, Dairy Industry Economic Inquiry, September 1961, p 3. 
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farmers, skimmed milk powder was sold to registered milk producers at a 
much reduced price.62 
 
Sales of skimmed milk powder remained lower than expected. The 
major obstacle which prevented a significant rise in sales was the very low 
prices at which this powder was imported into Southern Rhodesia from 
countries such as New Zealand and Canada. This was a result of the low 
production costs in those countries. The proliferation of cheap (and possibly 
better quality) imported skimmed milk powder worked to the disadvantage of 
local products.63 Unsuccessful representations were made to the federal 
government that it should place a duty on the imported product. The 
frustration of the DMB with this situation is seen in the following statement 
by T.C. Pascoe: 
 
It is considered inequitable that the Board should have to contend with 
external competition whilst handling a rapidly increasing milk surplus. 
Representations made to the government with a view to giving the local 
product the necessary tariff protection have so far proved unsuccessful. 
Surely, this is working to the detriment of the colony’s industry.64 
 
Representations to the government only bore fruit as late as 1962, 
when restrictions on the importation of milk powder were introduced. Prior to 
this development, huge stocks of locally made skimmed milk powder were 
piling up at most dairies with the result that the Board had to reduce the 
price at which it sold to registered milk producers to sub-economic levels.65 
From the Board’s point of view, one advantage of the conversion of milk into 
skim milk, however, was that it increased the amount of butterfat that could 
be separated for butter manufacture. It was for this reason that few 
incentives were made available for increased butter production. As butterfat 
manufacture decreased from the late 1950s onwards, albeit as a result of 
increased skim milk production, butter imports from New Zealand and South 
Africa began to decline considerably. 
 
From buoyancy to crisis: Production and marketing, 1957-1970s 
 
From the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, the fortunes of the dairy industry 
were evidently nose-diving. The buoyancy that had characterised the early 
1950s slowly began to give way to a looming crisis for both the DMB and the 
dairy farmers. As the operating environment of the Board became 
increasingly unsustainable, the government was forced to revise the 
incentives it was giving to farmers. This manifested itself in the adoption of a 
new pricing policy which led to the decline of producer prices. A number of 
related factors account for this phenomenon. The national economy, which 
had experienced considerable growth during the immediate post-Second 
World War years, began to slacken, with a consequent check to further 
expansion of dairy farming. From about 1957/1958, there was a marked 
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drop in gross capital formation. This began with a decline in the price of 
copper in 1956 and 1957,66 and was accentuated by the international 
economic recession in 1958 which stretched well into the 1960s. In addition, 
the high rate of European immigration, which increased with the outbreak of 
the war, had begun to subside somewhat from the late 1950s, with the 
result that the market for dairy products, which was predominantly white at 
this stage, ceased to expand. To make matters worse, this was happening 
against the backdrop of increasing dairy production. 
 
Despite the Board’s early efforts to broaden the market for dairy 
products, particularly in the lucrative whole milk trade, the increased rate of 
production continued to outstrip the growth of the market. In this case, the 
official policy to stimulate milk production during the early 1950s, which was 
in fundamental accord with the general post-war economic climate when 
more people earning and consuming more had to be supplied with more 
dairy products, had begun to be exhausted by the late 1950s. It was in this 
context that steps were taken to curtail incentives aimed at increasing 
production, as well as the measures taken to increase the market for dairy 
products, especially whole milk. The campaign was particularly aimed at the 
burgeoning African population in the main centres. Most controversial and 
far-reaching, however, were the steps taken to reduce, or even eliminate, 
competition to the Board in the retail of whole milk.  
 
The root of the problems bedevilling the dairy industry from the late 
1950s stemmed from increasing milk production on the dairy farms against 
a background of a market that was fast becoming saturated. By 1957, the 
production of milk was firmly on the ascendancy, with the Board receiving 
an average of an 8% increase per annum.67 Meanwhile, the rate of white 
population increase, on which the industry largely depended for the 
domestic market, was dropping. The African market, despite the early efforts 
to stimulate it, was still generally under utilised at this time. Table 1 below 
illustrates the decreasing rate of European immigration in the country.  
 
Table 1. Net European immigration 
 
Year Rate of increase per annum 
1955 
1958 
1959 
1960 
10 700 
4 300 
4 100 
1 900 
Source: Southern Rhodesia Economic Report (Government Printer, 1961). 
 
The falling rate of European immigration, coupled with decreasing 
purchasing power caused by the drop in economic growth, had the effect of 
                                                            
66.  As one of Southern Rhodesia’s federal partners, the performance of the copper 
industry in 
Northern Rhodesia inevitably had great significance in the entire federal economy. 
67.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report 1956/57, p 8. 
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increasing the proportion of milk converted into low realisation products 
such as cheese and skimmed milk. The result of this was that the Board’s 
profits, if ever they really existed, were decreasing with each passing year. 
This was so, largely because the prices that the DMB paid to producers 
were fixed by the government, after consultations with the RNFU. In fact, the 
DMB’s financial position was becoming dangerously precarious as its net 
realisation from the processing and sale of milk products continued to fall. 
By 1958, for instance, the proportion of milk that was converted into less 
remunerative products was nearly 58%.The increasing losses that the Board 
continued to incur during the mid 1950s may partly be attributed to the 
plummeting net realisation it received from the sale of dairy products against 
a background of increasing payouts to farmers. The loss of a whopping £86 
056 which the Board incurred during the 1956/1957 was attributed to the 
“suffocating financial situation in which the Board was obliged to pay 
producers increasingly high prices” without consideration of the income it 
was earning from the sale of the dairy products.68 
 
As already shown, the major problem associated with the conversion 
of surplus milk into skim milk (both liquid and powder), butter and especially 
cheese, was the low profit realisation of the products. In addition, although 
the price of liquid skim milk and “lacto” was increased in 1957 to economic 
levels, the profit accrued was a long way below the realisation from whole 
milk sales. Similarly, profits that could be made from the sale of skimmed 
milk powder were significantly lower when compared to whole milk sales. 
The proliferation of cheaper imported brands aggravated the problem. Table 
2 below illustrates the Board’s net realisation from various milk products in 
1958. 
 
Table 2. DMB’s net realisation from various milk products and 
gallonage absorbed, 1957/58 
Product Million gallons Profits * (% per 
gallon) 
Cheddar cheese  
Gouda cheese 
Ice cream 
Industrial milk 
Skim milk powder and butterfat 
Whole milk  
Liquid skim milk and butterfat 
1.7 
0.5 
0.1 
0.6 
2.1 
7.3 
1.0 
17.6 
18.9 
42.9 
23.0 
22.3 
49.8 
19.7 
*The profits shown are calculated without factoring in some general costs 
such as water, electricity, and other administrative expenses.  
Source: F.G. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Dairy Industry, 
1961. 
 
From the above statistics it can be observed that the most profitable 
products were whole milk and ice cream. In fact, liquid milk sales generally 
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offered better profit realisation than solid products such as cheese. A 
number of ways of increasing the sale of liquid milk (preferably as whole 
milk) were explored. As early as 1955, no doubt using the federal 
connection, efforts were made to find external markets for whole milk and 
sterilised milk in Northern Rhodesia. This initiative appeared viable at the 
time because there were milk shortages in the dairy industry in Northern 
Rhodesia, particularly on the Copper Belt where population densities were 
high and production of milk low.69 Experiments were successfully carried out 
in transporting milk from Salisbury to Lusaka with the results proving that the 
transportation could be done with minimal deterioration in the quality of milk. 
Within the year, Southern Rhodesia was exporting milk to Northern 
Rhodesia through the Co-operative Creameries of Northern Rhodesia 
(CCNR), a quasi-state enterprise through which the federal government 
regulated the dairy industry in that territory. For instance, in 1956 a total of 3 
million gallons of whole milk was exported to Northern Rhodesia.70 
However, this was not an assured market for Southern Rhodesia – her 
northern neighbour only accepted milk during the time of shortage and even 
then, it was only for a brief period of time. In his correspondence, O. 
Wadsworth, the chairperson of the CCNR intimated: 
 
We would be grateful to accept milk from Southern Rhodesia, but with the 
understanding that this arrangement will be short lived. This is because we 
are making frantic efforts to increase local production, and within a few years 
Northern Rhodesia should be self-supporting in milk.71 
 
Indeed, whole milk exports to Northern Rhodesia ceased in 
November 1958 and the CCNR stopped all imports of whole milk. Later 
attempts to export sterilised milk to the same territory were unsuccessful. 
DMB proposals to the federal government regarding the manufacture of the 
product were rejected by the federal treasury because it “considered that 
the market for this type of milk should be proved before the necessary 
capital was committed, and that the Board should pay the full unsubsidised 
cost of all milk used in this scheme”.72 This laid to rest all the hopes that 
Southern Rhodesia had of using the federal connection to solve her milk 
disposal problems prior to 1961, when the DMB took over the business of 
the CCNR. The DMB’s ongoing problem of milk disposal could not, it 
seemed, be solved by selling its milk surplus to Southern Rhodesia’s federal 
partners. This was so, particularly given the geographical and logistical 
problems that hindered the exportation of whole milk to Nyasaland, 
Southern Rhodesia’s other federal partner, despite the relatively 
undeveloped nature of that territory’s dairy industry. From the foregoing, one 
may argue that the existence of the federation did not play a crucial role in 
helping the Southern Rhodesia dairy industry during the 1950s. The 
existence of the CCNR in Northern Rhodesia which played a role largely 
                                                            
69.  NAZ, F429/18/1361, Milk Production and Consumption, 1953–1957.  
70.  NAZ, F429/18/1361, Milk Production and Consumption, 1953–1957.        
71.  NAZ, F429/18/1365/4, Letter from O. Chadsworth (chairman CCNR) to T.C. 
Pascoe (chairman BMB) re proposal for milk exports to Northern Rhodesia, 26 
May 1955. 
72.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1956/1957, p 11.  
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similar to that of the DMB in Southern Rhodesia, proved to be the greatest 
disadvantage to the DMB in its effort to exploit the Northern Rhodesian 
market. The geographical location of Nyasaland, given the technology of the 
time, made the transportation of whole milk virtually impossible. 
Following the failure to effectively exploit the federal market in the 
sale of whole milk, the Board explored the Portuguese East African market. 
Considering the relatively less sophisticated dairy industry in that territory at 
the time, it was felt that Portuguese East Africa could be used as an outlet 
to dispose surplus whole milk produced in Southern Rhodesia. An 
agreement between the two territories was reached at the beginning of 1956 
for the exportation of whole milk to Portuguese East Africa, particularly 
Beira. Milk in pint bottles was sent out to Beira from the Umtali dairy on the 
evening train which arrived in Beira the following morning, and 
approximately 1500 gallons a day were sold to a DMB agent in Beira.73 
Although part of the agreement between Portuguese East Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia, as with the one between Southern and Northern 
Rhodesia, provided that supplies “should not interfere with milk production 
in that territory”,74 sales to Portuguese East Africa in fact continued to 
increase until the mid 1970s when the territory attained independence and 
ceased diplomatic relations with Rhodesia. The continued increase in sales 
to that territory was caused by the fact that the dairy industry there was not 
developed enough to cater sufficiently for all its dairy needs. What emerges 
from this scenario is that in the dairy industry, Portuguese East Africa 
became a far more useful trading partner to Southern Rhodesia than both 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for much of the 1950s, and even 
beyond. 
 
The impact of all the strenuous efforts to increase liquid milk sales 
both within and outside Southern Rhodesia from 1954 to 1956 was 
counteracted by the astronomical growth in milk production. As sales 
increased steadily, production levels were sky rocketing to the extent that 
the proportion of milk that needed to be converted into the less 
remunerative products like cheese and skimmed milk powder was 
constantly increasing. Given the slackened rate of growth of the national 
economy and apparent saturation of the market for whole milk, the 
incentives for stimulating production became increasingly difficult to sustain. 
By late 1956, the writing began to appear on the wall that the status quo 
could not be maintained indefinitely. 
 
This scenario generated debate on whether it was still necessary to 
continue with incentives aimed at increasing production at a time when the 
bulk of the milk was converted into the much needed but less remunerative 
products such as cheese, butter and skimmed milk powder. The debate was 
made even more complex by the fact that although the colony had 
successfully managed to satisfy the demand for whole milk, seasonal 
shortages of cheese and butter had not yet been completely eradicated. In 
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addition, a greater proportion of the skimmed milk powder that was 
consumed in the country at this time was imported. 
 
Initially, the government’s position, as was the case with general 
agricultural policy, was to push for self-sufficiency in all dairy products. This 
implied that the government still preferred to have increased production of 
milk so that more milk could be converted into cheese and other products so 
that it could eventually achieve self sufficiency. However, this policy was 
proving expensive for the dairy industry. Given the higher costs of 
manufacturing products other than whole milk, it was felt it would be better 
to think in terms of importing these products rather than manufacturing them 
at a considerable loss to the Board.75 T.C Pascoe argued that pursuing self-
sufficiency in all dairy products under the current operating environment 
would be “financially ruinous to the Board”.76 The logic of this argument 
stemmed from the fact that the other products could not yet be viably 
manufactured and hence increasing the proportion of milk converted into 
other products would ruin the economics of the Board’s operation. Instead, it 
advocated the review of the pricing system so that the prices paid to the 
farmers would reflect the declining net realisation their milk fetched for the 
Board. 
 
In support of the DMB’s position, the Dairy Association criticised the 
policy of self-sufficiency, arguing that the Board should concentrate on 
those products which could help the industry survive. Writing to the RNFU, 
A. Harvey, the president of the Dairy Association noted: 
 
In considering whether the aim should be complete self-sufficiency in dairy 
produce, the Association concludes that the Federation could not hope to 
produce economically every single dairy product. Self sufficiency would 
mean in effect [mean producing] surplus [for] export. In view of the conditions 
surrounding the production of dairy products here as compared with other 
exporting countries such as New Zealand and Australia, the Association 
recommends that self-sufficiency in all dairy products would not, in the 
present circumstances, be a proper aim for agricultural policy.77 
 
The Dairy Association went further to suggest that first priority should 
be given to the processing of whole milk, and the exploration of 
opportunities for the export of the product, after which the second priority 
should be other liquid milk products such as sterilised milk and liquid skim 
milk to meet domestic needs. Taking third priority would be the manufacture 
of Cheddar and Gouda cheese, and this was because, in addition to the 
issue of low returns from their manufacture, the products had a significantly 
smaller domestic market.78 The view of the Board and the Dairy Association 
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eventually won the day. The government giving in to their position. The 
colony continued to be a net exporter of whole milk while at the same time 
periodically importing cheese and butter from South Africa and Kenya until 
the late 1960s.  
 
It was in this light that the DMB successfully lobbied for the 
introduction of a two-pool pricing system under which the first price would be 
paid for milk that would be utilised as whole milk and a separate, and lower 
price would then be paid for milk that would be utilised as industrial milk.79 In 
comparison with the quota system, both the government and the RNFU 
agreed that this pricing mechanism would help to stabilise the financial 
position of the Board while at the same time eliminating inefficient producers 
who had been solely dependent on high producer prices for their survival. 
Because the government was reeling from the effects of the economic 
recession, it could hardly afford to subsidise the farmers by maintaining the 
high producer prices. It is in this context that the eventual compromise 
between a market based system and a fixed price system should be 
located. Indeed, average producer prices paid for milk by 1964 had fallen to 
32.20d from 37.50d per gallon in 1957.80 
 
Despite the constantly declining producer prices, the intake of milk at 
the country’s dairies continued to increase, albeit at a slower rate. In theory, 
of course, declining prices should have curbed increased production and 
bring price stability. In reality, this was not the case. On the contrary, the 
milk intake at all diaries continued to increase from year to year until the 
mid-1970s.This is with the exception of the 1958/59 year when the initial 
shock of price reductions led to a decreased output. A number of factors 
account for this phenomenon. Unlike other agricultural branches such as 
maize and tobacco farming, dairying is a long-term project which one cannot 
quit overnight once investments have been made. Instead of forsaking the 
industry, most farmers sought other survival strategies within the industry, 
including the earlier discussed cost-cutting measures and improving 
efficiency on the farms. The other factor was that, like farmers in other 
spheres of agriculture, dairy farmers sought to meet the challenge of 
declining prices by increasing yield. They countered the smaller profit 
margin by increasing the output of milk to maintain the substantial profit 
levels they had achieved during the era of high prices. This was particularly 
rife among dairymen who practiced mono-farming because of limited land 
holdings.81 
 
In addition, the situation in other formerly more lucrative spheres of 
agriculture was equally, if not more, lugubrious. Farmers in the maize and 
tobacco sectors were facing a more serious profitability crisis during the late 
1950s through to the 1960s. Maize producers were reeling under the yoke 
of the unprofitable export burden as the positive impact of the Second World 
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War on the industry had begun to fade.82 This meant that, instead of 
switching away from dairying, there was instead an increase in the number 
of farmers venturing into dairying. It is in this light that the Commission of 
Inquiry into the dairy industry in 1961 reported that: 
 
There is a possibility during the next year or two, with a decline in the maize 
price and with rising costs or lower prices in the tobacco industry, that 
dairying will become more profitable relative to those crops than it is at 
present and will be increasingly looked to by farmers.83 
 
The net effect of this was the worsening of the situation regarding 
producer prices. As more milk was converted into products other than whole 
milk, the payout to producers from the net-realisation profit declined further. 
Crucially, the situation had dire financial consequences for the Board itself. 
From 1957 onwards, the DMB’s financial position was becoming 
dangerously precarious as its net realisation from the processing and sale of 
milk by-products began to fall. In 1958, for instance, the proportion of milk 
that was converted into less remunerative products was nearly 58 percent of 
total milk received.84 The increasing losses that the Board continued to incur 
from the mid-1950s may partly be attributed to the plummeting net 
realisation it received from the sale of low profit by-products against a 
background of increasing payouts to farmers. For example, the significant 
loss of £86 056 which the Board incurred during the period 1956/1957 was 
attributed to the “suffocating financial situation in which the Board was 
obliged to pay producers increasingly high prices, without due consideration 
of the income it was earning from the sale of less remunerative products”.85 
It became increasingly clear that in addition to increased farm efficiency, the 
solution lay in the expansion of the whole milk market. 
 
Expanding the market 
 
The DMB was pushed to find additional outlets of whole milk both within and 
outside the territory by the increasing proportion of milk that was utilised for 
the manufacture of the less rewarding products such as cheese, skimmed 
milk powder, among others. Two unrelated factors, as earlier illustrated, 
connived to bring about this situation – the impact of increased milk 
production was aggravated by the decreasing rate of European immigration 
from the late 1950s. This forced the DMB to shift its attention to the African 
urban market. It is the contention of the author that more than any other 
reason, it was the need to increase the whole milk market in the face of the 
saturated and static European population that a vigorous drive was made to 
make urban Africans more milk conscious. To claim, as the Board often did, 
that the move was driven by a desire to improve the health of Africans is 
certainly to major on minor issues. 
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Virtually all investigations on the methods that could be used to 
increase whole milk sales pointed to the need to develop the African market 
as the long term solution to the Board’s ongoing marketing problems. The 
Agricultural Marketing Council in 1958 stated that it considered “that the 
long term solution to the producer’s cost price dilemma lies in increasing the 
proportion of milk on the whole milk market through an expansion of sales of 
liquid milk to the vast potential African consumer market”.86 In the same 
vein, the 1959 Committee of Inquiry into the Dairy Industry noted that there 
was a “large potential market among Africans, which can be expected to 
consume more, both with changing patterns of urban life among Africans 
and incomes per head”.87It went on to recommend that “every effort be 
made to increase the sale of milk to the urban African population”.88 
 
The 1961 Commission of Inquiry was more elaborative in its analysis 
of the pivotal role the urban African population was to play in the 
development of the dairy industry. It advocated the development of a 
strategy aimed at studying the culture and habits of Africans with a view to 
push them to become more ardent milk consumers. In no uncertain terms, it 
reported that: 
 
In view of [Southern] Rhodesia’s racial composition, and the prospect of the 
large African population doubling every twenty-five years and becoming 
urban dwellers even faster, it is incumbent on the dairy industry and the 
Government to develop the African market by all means conceivable. It is no 
use complaining, as occurred all too frequently in the course of our hearings, 
that the urban African develops a predilection for cold drinks and beer than 
for milk … All producers of consumer goods, and its importers too, are vying 
hard for a share of the African dollar, and it will depend on the efficacy of the 
efforts of the Board on what share the dairy industry gets.89 
 
There is no doubt that this statement gives further credence to the 
contention that more than just the earlier purported agenda of improving 
nutritional health of the African sector, the authorities sought to push for the 
involvement of Africans in the industry as consumers so that they could 
increase their “share of the African dollar”. 
 
A battery of measures was taken to increase whole milk sales to the 
African urban dweller. The erection of numerous DMB depots in African 
townships should be viewed in this light. The first milk depot to commence 
operations was in the Harari [renamed Mbare in 1980 when Salisbury was 
renamed Harare] township of Salisbury in 1958, and another was built in 
Gatooma later in the same year.90 In explaining the rationale behind the 
establishment of depots, the Board stated: 
 
As whole milk utilisation is on the decline, further efforts will be made to 
increase sales, especially to the African population. With this end in view, the 
Board has made representations to most of the municipalities for permission 
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to operate fixed depots in African locations from which milk, skim milk and 
other dairy products can be sold.91 
 
The number of depots in African townships increased so much that by 
1980, on the eve of independence, the Board had a depot in more than half 
of the country’s African townships. 
 
In addition, the Board began to employ more Africans in the major 
towns as “delivery boys”. These people would move around in most African 
locations on tricycles, marketing dairy products to the people. Indeed, the 
Board reported in 1976 that the huge expenditure in the early 1960s on the 
recruitment of African salesmen had begun to pay dividends as “sales in 
African areas have been growing and, in the process, compensating for the 
reduced sales in European areas”.92 In order to increase the sales by the 
salesmen, two means were used to entice consumers to purchase milk. 
 
Beginning in July 1962, a new pricing system was adopted after 
gaining the approval of the government. Under this system the cash price 
for milk was fixed at an inflated price of 8.25d per pint. In addition a new 
price of 5/3d per gallon for milk purchases in excess of three gallons at one 
time was adopted.93 Also, the use of tokens, as an alternative to cash 
payments, was introduced in 1961.Under this system, consumers could 
purchase packets of tokens which they could use to pay for milk. The 
advantages which were claimed in respect of this system were that “it 
speeds up deliveries and consumer satisfaction is increased”.94 By the late 
1960s, this method of payment had increased in popularity. However, its 
popularity was especially noticeable among the European consumers; 
Africans seldom bought the tokens because they preferred to buy milk for 
immediate use. In fact, this situation led many DMB officials to develop the 
attitude that Africans were mean and had not yet learned the basics of 
budgeting and savings.95 One producer suggested that Africans “should be 
taught to desist from the habit of overspending on immediate pleasures”.96 
What the authorities, and indeed, the rest of the white community chose to 
ignore were the relatively more difficult economic circumstances that African 
workers faced as a result of the wide gap that existed between black and 
white income levels. 
 
In another attempt to increase the outlet of whole milk, in 1957 the 
board introduced a scheme of supplying school children with one-third pint 
bottles of milk in Salisbury. Under this scheme, fresh milk was sold to 
primary school children in close collaboration with school authorities.97 To 
increase the popularity of this scheme the DMB in 1961 decided to 
introduce a monthly prize of £10 to the funds of the school which sold the 
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most milk in relation to pupils on the attendance register.98 This became a 
permanent scene in most African schools in Salisbury throughout the 
colonial period with the result that an average of 520 000 gallons of milk 
were utilised for this purpose between 1964 and 1974.99 It is worth nothing 
that this arrangement, which was adopted from England where pupils were 
given free milk at the expense of the government,100 was justified in 
Southern Rhodesia on the grounds that it would “inculcate in young Africans 
the desire for milk at an early age”.101 While in England it was aimed at 
improving the health of children, particularly those with a disadvantaged 
background, since milk is known to “show an increase of 20% in height and 
weight in children between 5 and 15 years of age regularly taking it over 
those without access to it,102 in Southern Rhodesia the underlying principle 
was increasing the market. This plan to inculcate milk consuming habits in 
Africans from a tender age should be viewed within the general opinion that 
African men seemed to have a predilection towards alcohol and soft drinks. 
 
So determined were the Board’s efforts to increase the consumption 
of dairy products, particularly whole milk, that a series of advertisements 
and campaigns were launched. These were done through the medium of 
the press and cinema advertisements “with the object of impressing upon 
the consumer, particularly the African, the value of milk and milk products in 
the daily diet”.103 In addition, efforts were also made to increase the sale of 
whole milk together with acidulated lactic milk (lacto) which had become 
increasingly popular among Africans, through the employment of African 
demonstrators and dieticians who moved around African institutions 
“educating” Africans on the importance of milk and other dairy products to 
their general health. In May, 1958, a sales promotion officer was appointed, 
and was followed shortly afterwards by the appointment of a female 
dietician whose main duty was to hold a series of lectures and 
demonstrations at African institutions.104 These campaigns contributed 
significantly to improving the sales of dairy products among Africans. In 
1965, H. Wulfsohn, the acting chairman of the DMB, could reflect on the 
success of the programme with satisfaction and say “… these efforts, 
together with requests for the Board to extend its activities by entering 
certain other towns, have resulted in substantial sales increases over the 
past six years”.105 Indeed, sales of whole milk in African townships 
increased from an average of 92 000 gallons in 1959/1960 to 352 000 
gallons in 1964/1965.106 
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In addition to increasing the number of depots in African townships as 
well as the number of salesmen making door-to-door deliveries in African 
areas, in 1967 the Board introduced a new milk booklet entitled Milk is Best 
which was liberally illustrated with photographs showing Africans at work 
and children at play enjoying a glass of milk.107 This booklet, which was 
conveniently printed in the indigenous Shona and SiNdebele languages, 
was distributed through social welfare organisations and by advertisements 
in popular magazines.108 In a further effort to reach out to the African 
market, an extensive advertising campaign through the radio, cinema and 
print media was introduced in 1969. Slogans such as “Milk Turns Men into 
Tigers!” became a popular jingle in most DMB advertisements. Particularly 
interesting was one advert which appeared on DMB motor vans during the 
late 1960s with a picture of a cheerful tiger holding up a glass of milk. 
Underneath this picture was a caption which read: “This is a glass of Tiger 
Juice, some people still call it milk. Buy it from the DMB!”109 
 
Besides targeting the burgeoning urban African population, the Board 
also engaged private enterprises for the purposes of increasing its sales of 
whole milk. In 1960, the government commenced negotiations with Nestlé 
(Pty) Ltd for the construction of a milk plant in Salisbury that would 
manufacture skimmed milk powder, condensed milk and baby milk products. 
The company began operations in 1961. As a matter of policy, the company 
was forbidden from buying its milk from producers or any other source 
besides the DMB.110 This arrangement worked to the benefit of the Board in 
one important way – although the manufacture of skimmed milk provider by 
a private concern increased competition for the Board’s own products, the 
arrangement assured the Board of a market for the more remunerative 
whole milk. In any case, as an internationally reputable company with vast 
experience in dairy production, Nestlé had a better capacity to produce 
manufactured dairy products at a profit than the Board. Indeed, the 
company continued to take increasing quantities of milk from the Board for 
the purposes of manufacturing full cream milk powder and proprietary baby 
foods for both local and export markets. For instance, the volume of milk 
supplied to Nestlé during 1964/1965 was 2 682 000 gallons, representing 
approximately 16 percent of the Board’s total milk intake.111 
 
The government granted an operating licence to Lyons Ltd in 1962 for 
much the same reason that it allowed Nestlé to operate. However, the 
Board was initially inclined to cavil at this decision because, unlike full cream 
and skimmed milk powder which Nestlé produced, the Board had always 
obtained a high price return from the manufacture of ice cream. Hence, it felt 
that Lyons, as a company that had attained considerable international status 
and had more technical resources, would effectively out-compete and push 
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the Board out of the ice cream business.112 However, considering that a 
very small amount of milk is utilised in ice cream manufacture and that 
whole milk sales always fetched higher returns, the Board eventually 
changed its position. In any event, Lyons drew its supplies from the DMB as 
a matter of policy. 
 
Perhaps one of the most important moves taken by the Board during 
the 1960s in its attempt to expand the market for its products was the 
takeover of Northern Rhodesia’s CCNR in 1962. The DMB was responsible 
only for the regulation of the dairy industry in Southern Rhodesia, despite 
the existence of the Central African Federation. The CCNR acted as a 
government agency, and was the medium through which the industry was 
regulated in Northern Rhodesia, the industry was so undeveloped in 
Nyasaland that no regulatory body was needed.113 What proved to be to the 
DMB’s disadvantage with regard to the Nyasaland market were the 
geographical challenges involved in the transportation of whole milk. This 
arrangement, as shown earlier, was largely responsible for the fact that 
Southern Rhodesia could not penetrate her federal partners’ markets in any 
significant way. In any case, she was struggling to satisfy her own local 
needs when the federation was instituted. As the need for markets 
increased, the Board, through the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, lobbied for 
the creation of one single regulatory authority for both Southern Rhodesia 
and Northern Rhodesia. In fact, as the writing began to appear on the wall 
that the local market was fast becoming saturated, the 1959 Committee of 
Inquiry reported that: 
 
The Committee considers that it is desirable to have overall marketing 
control in the Federation in the hands of one Federal marketing organisation, 
and recommends accordingly. The existing co-operative in Northern 
Rhodesia could become an agent of this overall authority.114 
 
Given the relatively greater political clout of Southern Rhodesia and 
her white settlers in comparison with the northern federal territories, and the 
increasingly dire circumstances in which their dairy industry was operated, 
the lobby was met with little resistance from the federal government. To this 
end, negotiations for the takeover of the CCNR’s operations between the 
federal government and the CCNR commenced in mid-1961, with the result 
that the DMB officially took over the Northern Rhodesian dairy industry in 
July 1962, on an initial caretaker basis pending finalisation of the 
Creameries’ accounts and completion of other formalities.115 The most 
important impact of this takeover was that Southern Rhodesia began to 
consider her northern neighbour as part of the “domestic” market. Within the 
eighteen months that this arrangement lasted, vast quantities of whole milk 
and sterilised milk were transported to Northern Rhodesia, particularly the 
Copperbelt region where a ready market existed. Approximately 5 500 000 
gallons of milk, a modest 1 000 lb of butter, and 1 850 lb of Cheddar and 
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Gouda cheese were disposed of in that territory as the DMB took charge of 
all the twelve dairies that the CCNR had operated in Northern Rhodesia.116 
However, and unfortunately for the DMB, this arrangement was short lived: 
it broke down together with the dissolution of the federation in 1963, and the 
Board was forced to cease its operations in that territory. 
 
Elimination of producer retailers  
 
It has already been illustrated that prior to the formation of the DMB the 
processing and distribution side of the industry was dominated by private 
enterprise. Initially, the mandate of the Board was, in the main, to act as a 
regulatory body in the industry and to ensure the orderly purchasing, 
processing and marketing of dairy produce. However, the Board eventually 
took over the role of private enterprises due to the parlous state of most of 
the dairies and creameries and the collapsing distribution system in the 
major consuming centres. Although a few enterprises remained in private 
hands, the Board established itself as the dominant player in the purchasing 
of milk and butterfat from producers. For much of the 1950s, the position of 
the DMB as a monopoly in the purchasing and retailing of produce was 
more of a posture than a policy. With time, it manifested itself in the decision 
to accept Nestlé and Lyons on the strict condition that they purchased their 
milk for industrial purposes exclusively from the Board. 
 
However, it was in distribution and retail that the Board most actively 
sought to establish itself as a de-facto monopoly through the restrictive 
policies that were enunciated during the 1960s.This was despite the fact 
that the first concept of the Board was that it should be a supervisory and 
controlling body rather than a commercial enterprise. Its involvement in the 
retail business, as the Board claimed, was necessitated by the refusal by 
many prospective distribution agents to go into business on the existing 
narrow margins brought about by the system of controlling retail prices at 
uneconomically low levels. Once the Board became involved in retailing 
from the late 1950s onwards, it began to restrict the activities of the few 
producer-retailers117 who operated in the same areas. Working in cahoots 
with the government, the Board unleashed a cocktail of restrictive measures 
aimed at elbowing out producer-retailers, and, in the process it monopolised 
the whole milk market. The DMB thus became entangled in the wider 
debate and the question of the operation of parastatal monopolies in both 
colonial and post-colonial states. 
 
Under the Dairy Marketing Scheme of 1952, which governed the 
marketing of dairy products until 1961, the Board was required to register as 
producer-retailers “any persons, who wish to sell by retail, milk of their own 
production”.118 In addition, the scheme allowed producer-retailers to deliver 
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surplus to the Board, receiving a price equivalent to the price paid from the 
net realisation pool only.119 The number of these producer-retailers in the 
urban areas where the Board’s activities were centred was too small during 
the early 1950s to threaten the retail business of the Board. In any event, 
the market in these areas was far from saturated at this point in time. 
However, their numbers began to increase from the late 1950s when the 
decreasing pay out from the DMB pushed some producers on the retail 
market. This was because the gap between the controlled consumer prices 
and producer prices was increasing on an annual basis. This development, 
coming as it did at a time when the Board was struggling to find additional 
outlets for its products, constituted a serious threat to the Board. 
 
As early as 1956, the Board began to raise concerns regarding the 
activities of producer-retailers operating in the urban areas. It pointed out 
that “there have been indications that the Board will face increasing 
competition from producer-retailers who sell milk in the centres which the 
Board operates”. 120 As the Board’s sales of whole milk began to increase at 
a much slower pace, leading to the decline in producer prices, calls for the 
checking of the business activities grew louder with the 1959 Committee of 
Inquiry recommending that urgent measures be taken to control producer-
retailers. It stated: 
 
Those [producer-retailers] who are operating outside the scheduled areas 
which are covered by the Board are performing a useful service to 
consumers and it recommends that no steps should be taken to discourage 
their continued operations. Those who confine their activities to areas where 
the DMB operates are in strong competition with that body …The distribution 
organisation of the DMB is adequate enough to supply the whole of the 
areas served by it. The activities of the producer-retailers in these areas are 
largely superfluous.121 
 
The scheduled areas which the 1959 Committee referred to were the 
areas within a seven mile radius of the main post offices of Salisbury, 
Bulawayo, Gwelo, Umtali, Que Que, Gatooma and Fort Victoria. These 
areas were prescribed by the Dairy Marketing Scheme as the main centres 
where the Board was to focus its efforts. Given the increasing profitability of 
producer-retailing as compared to delivering milk to the DMB, the 
Committee went on to recommend the imposition of a levy to be charged on 
each gallon that was sold within the scheduled areas. The levy would be 
payable to the Board. 
 
In addition, the 1959 Committee of Inquiry defended the controlling of 
producer-retailers on the grounds that while the Board sold pasteurised milk 
to the public, nearly all producer retailers sold unpasteurised milk. The 
Board itself also argued that producer-retailers should be eliminated from 
the scheduled areas because their milk was a health hazard to the 
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consuming public since producer-retailers did not have the requisite 
processing equipment.122 A closer look at this point will show that both the 
Board and the 1959 Committee were raising genuine concerns with regard 
to the quality status and general hygienic conditions under which that milk 
was prepared for retail. Indeed, even the 1961 Commission which, in its final 
analysis, recommended that producer-retailers be allowed to operate on 
condition of their strict adherence to certain hygienic conditions in the 
production, processing and packaging of milk and cream, found that some 
of these players did not in fact adhere to certain of these quality standards. 
It noted that some producer-retailers’ standards “leave much to be desired 
in both premises and methods …123  
 
Although these claims were justified, it is questionable whether they 
necessitated the elimination of producer retailers. Instead, one would argue 
that what needed to be done was to lay down certain quality standards 
which all producer-retailers would be required to adhere to prior to their 
registration. After all, the 1959 Committee found them to be quite “useful” in 
those areas where the Board was not operating. It thus becomes highly 
questionable whether the Board’s primary concern was hygiene and the 
general health of consumers or the elimination of competition. 
 
The government responded to the pressure from the Board and the 
recommendations of the 1959 Committee of Inquiry by enacting the Dairy 
Produce and Marketing Levy Act in 1961. In essence, this legislation 
replaced the Dairy Marketing Act, which had given birth to the Dairy 
Marketing Scheme of 1952. However, most of the provisions of the earlier 
Act were retained in the 1961 legislation. By far the most far reaching and 
somewhat controversial changes that came with the new Act concerned the 
operations of producer-retailers. It provided that all producer-wholesalers124 
and producer-retailers had to re-apply for registration to the DMB and the 
conditions under which registration was granted to producer-retailers was 
placed under the direct control of the Board. While the registration of 
producer-wholesales was for a five-year period, producer-retailers had to 
register on an annual basis.125 
 
Producer-retailers had to pay a monthly levy to the Board. This levy 
was imposed by the Minister of Agriculture. At the time it was at the rate of 
2d per pint on the amount of which they sold in scheduled areas, provided 
such amount was in excess of 30 gallons per day.126 This levy, it was 
claimed, was to be used to meet any costs and expenses incurred by the 
Board and for the purposes of making payments into the Dairy Produce 
                                                            
122.  NAZ S/DA57, DMB, Annual Report, 1958/1959, p 10. 
123.  NAZ, FG4, Report of the Commission of Inquiry,1961,p 77. 
124.  The term “producer-wholesalers” referred to those producers who delivered their 
unprocessed milk to the DMB.   
125.  NAZ, RG2, Parliamentary Select Committee on Restrictive Trade Practices, 1969, 
p 3. 
126.  NAZ, RG2, Parliamentary Select Committee on Restrictive Trade Practices, 1969, 
p 3. 
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Price Stabilisation Fund, and for the general development of the industry.127 
The Act further gave the Board the power to refuse to register an applicant if 
registration “would not, in the opinion of the Board, be conducive to the 
orderly and efficient marketing of the dairy produce…”.128 However, 
producers whose applications for registration were refused by the Board, or 
who felt aggrieved by any conditions imposed upon them, had the right to 
appeal to the Minister.129 In addition, the 1961 Act empowered the Board to 
acquire the businesses of producer-retailers with the consent of the Minister 
of Agriculture.130 
 
Following the introduction of the Dairy Produce Marketing and Levy 
Act, the Board decided to follow certain principles regarding conditions of 
registration of producer-retailers in scheduled areas. The crux of this policy 
was that no new producer-retailers would be allowed to expand their 
activities in areas where the Board operated or intended to operate in the 
future. This control applied to sales of both while milk and fresh cream. 
Indeed from 1961 onwards, the Board did not register any new producer-
retailer for business in the scheduled areas, while existing players were not 
allowed to expand the scope of their businesses. As the Board began to flex 
the muscles it derived from the new Act, the number of producer-retailers 
began to fall, while that of producer-wholesalers began to increase. 
Whereas there were 108 producer-retailers operating in the scheduled 
areas in 1960/61, only 40 were still operating in the same areas in 1964/65, 
and by 1979 there was only one registered producer-retailer operating in the 
scheduled areas.131 Fourteen of the casualties had been taken over by the 
Board itself. 
 
The steps taken to check the operations of the producer-retailers, 
which in the process strengthened the position of the Board, was widely 
condemned by many dairy farmers and other independent observers. The 
Dairy Producer Marketing and Levy Act was criticized for the “dictatorial 
powers” it had conferred on the Board. The Producer-Retailers Association, 
the most aggrieved party, argued that the playing field was heavily tilted in 
favour of the Board because the Act “delivers producer-retailers into the 
hands of the Board”.132 It further observed that: 
 
The provision of the Act which sets out the Board’s powers to refuse 
registration, if in its opinion such registration would not be conducive to 
orderly and efficient marketing is incredibly far-reaching. There is no working 
                                                            
127.  NAZ, RG2, Parliamentary Select Committee on Restrictive Trade Practices, 1969, 
p 3.   
128.  NAZ, F322/1336/F3, Dairy Produce Marketing and Levy Bill, Minister’s Papers, 
1961. 
129.  NAZ, F322/1336/F3, Dairy Produce Marketing and Levy Bill, Minister’s Papers, 
1961. 
130.  NAZ, F322/1336/F3, Dairy Produce Marketing and Levy Bill, Minister’s Papers, 
1961. 
131.  See, NAZ, S/DA57, DMB, Annual Reports for 1960/1961; 1964/1965; and 
1979/1980. 
132.  NAZ, F324 (5005–5007), Monthly and other reports, 1960/1964, Report of the 
Producer-Retailers’ Association, 1963. 
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definition of “orderly and efficient” marketing or what would or would not be 
conducive thereto … The Board as the arbiter is virtually at liberty to refuse 
any application on these grounds.133 
 
This view resonated with E.M. Chadwick, a producer-retailer, who 
disparaged the entire idea of restricting the registration of producer-retailers 
on the basis that the Board wanted to ensure “orderly and efficient 
marketing”. With a certain measure of anger, he posited that “it is 
inconceivable that such phraseology should be allowed to remain upon our 
statute books without an attempt to define or explain its meaning”.134 
 
In fact, the entire provision was condemned by the 1969 
Parliamentary Select Committee on Restrictive Trade Practices and Trade 
Monopolies for its attempt to destroy private enterprise. It stated that:  
 
… it is entirely wrong to give this power to the Board, and assuming that it is 
necessary at all, it should remain vested in the Minister or some independent 
person or body. The Board is in competition with producer-retailers, and it is 
unthinkable that the Board should be given such near-arbitrary powers over 
its competitors, the effect of which is to place the Board in an invidious 
position of being the accuser and then made to act fairly as the judge in a 
matter where its financial interests are concerned.135 
 
The 1969 Committee further argued that although applicants for 
registration could seek recourse to the Minister of Agriculture or even to the 
High Court if they felt aggrieved, this provision was long on rhetoric and 
short on practical implementation. Given the long bureaucratic processes 
involved in this exercise, the select committee found this system to be 
“inefficient in the first instance, and extremely difficult in the latter”.136 
Indeed, this view is authenticated by he Board’s own records. In his 
1966/1967 report, E.W Hornby, the DMB chairman at the time, unwittingly 
boasted that of the 97 producer-retailers his body had denied registration in 
the scheduled areas since 1962, but that only one had bothered to appeal 
and, even then, this appeal had been unsuccessful. Also controversial was 
the fact that the vast majority of applicants who were turned down had 
intended to operate in the “DMB areas”. 
 
There were also ongoing complaints regarding the levies that 
producer-retailers were forced to pay to the Board. Although the levy was 
ostensibly established as a contribution to the Price Stabilisation Fund, the 
Board would, at times, use the funds accrued in this way to market the 
DMB’s own products. For example, in its financial statement for 1966/1967, 
the Board indicated that it had utilised an accumulated amount of £10 000 
for marketing purposes. Producer-retailers thus justifiably complained that:  
 
                                                            
133.  NAZ, F324 (5005–5007), Monthly and other reports, 1960/1964, Report of the 
Producer-Retailers’ Association, 1963. 
134.  Quoted in a letter to the Editor of The Rhodesia Herald, 7 April, 1967. 
135.  NAZ, RG2, Parliamentary Select Committee on Restrictive Trade Practices and 
Trade Monopolies, 1969, p 8. 
136.  NAZ, RG2, Parliamentary Select Committee on Restrictive Trade Practices and 
Trade      Monopolies, 1969, p 8. 
151
Milk (over)production in Colonial Zimbabwe 
 
151 
 
the use of levy moneys to advertise DMB products and encourage milk 
consumption in opposition to the producer-retailer, particularly as the 
producers have no way of participating in any increased market because of 
the restrictions placed upon them, constitutes serious fraud on the part of the 
Board.137 
 
In fact, it is rather surprising and even dubious that there is apparently no 
recorded information with regard to the utilisation of the levies that the 
Board collected from producer-retailers. 
 
The deliberate moves to create a monopoly in the retailing of milk and 
cream in the so-called scheduled areas led to wider calls for the institution of 
investigations into the operations of the DMB. Spearheading this campaign, 
and predictably so, were the Producer-Retailers’ Association and the RNFU. 
In fact, the former began to argue that the Board was a huge waste of 
financial resources which needed to be dissolved. It reasoned thus: 
 
Southern Rhodesia cannot afford to support a DMB with such a sparsely 
populated consumer market. The maintenance of the Board has never been 
brought into question and all inquiries of the dairy industry have directed their 
investigations towards the Board’s administration and powers. The producer-
retailer and the consumer have been forced to pay for the doubtful pleasure 
of having a DMB.138 
 
Although the Producer-Retailers’ Association was justified in calling 
for more scrutiny of the operations of the parastatal body, the suggestion 
implied in this statement for the dismantling of the Board seems to be taking 
these issues rather too far. The Association appeared to have conveniently 
forgotten the crucial role played by the Board in regulating and stabilising 
the industry since 1952. However, the claims of the Association that the 
consuming public was also being short-changed by the Board’s move may 
be justified in other terms. By restricting the activities of producer-retailers in 
the “scheduled areas”, the Board was denying the urban dwellers the right 
to choice. It is interesting to note that some consumers preferred to 
purchase milk and cream from producer-retailers ahead of the Board’s 
products. Most producer-retailers developed personal relationships with 
their customers – so much so that they knew the diverse needs of their 
individual customers. For instance, they could deliver creamier milk to 
customers on request, or milk from a particular type of dairy breed.139 The 
general feeling among some consumers is captured in a letter written by L. 
Montgomery which appeared in a local newspaper in 1965. In part, it read: 
 
I am sure many [people] will concur that [the] disappearance of most 
independent suppliers in Salisbury over the past few years has caused a 
considerable inconvenience to the consuming public. Most of them were 
much more efficient in distribution than the DMB. ... Besides, unlike the 
pasteurised milk that the Board sells, the independent suppliers do not mix 
                                                            
137.  NAZ, S32214 (S002–5005), Report of the Producer-Retailers’ Association, 1970. 
138.  NAZ, S32214 (S002–5005), Report of the Producer-Retailers’ Association, 1970. 
139.  Some consumers found milk from a particular breed more palatable to their tastes 
and could thus make individual arrangements with these providers. The Board did 
not offer such services.                                               
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milk from different types of breeds … My family have become accustomed to 
the tasty Jersey milk. It is our earnest hope that they [producer-retailers] will 
be allowed to resume operations.140 
 
From the foregoing, it is clear that despite their shortcomings in terms 
of hygiene, producer-retailers had certain advantages over the Board on the 
market. In fact, it was their close sensitivity to market needs that endeared 
them to the consumers. It was in this light that the Board, in addition to 
taking measures to push them out of business in the major urban centres, 
sought to disparage producer-retailers as “agents of unclean, unpasteurised 
milk”.141 
 
Despite having initially sought to use agents in the distribution of dairy 
products during the early days of the DMB’s formation, the position began to 
change in the 1960s. The Board now preferred to distribute its own 
products. This change should be situated in the difficult times that it 
encountered in the marketing of dairy products during the 1960s. As the 
market was becoming saturated, the Board became increasingly suspicious 
of the activities of the agents. It is in this context that it decided not to renew 
its contract with Messrs Myburgh & Hodgson Limited for the distribution of 
milk in Umtali in 1963.142 The same was done with the Board’s agent in Fort 
Victoria the following year.143 In order to understand the rationale behind this 
move, the report of the 1969 select committee is particularly revealing. It 
stated: 
 
... your committee received evidence from licensed agents of the DMB who 
claimed that they had been restricted in their right to sell competitive dairy 
products, and in one instance a licence had been withdrawn because the 
agent continued to supply a competitor’s product.144 
 
Clearly, the Board preferred to distribute its own products so that it 
could safeguard its monopoly position in the industry. Between 1963 and 
1979, a total of eight concerns which had been operating as agents were 
taken over and turned into mere depots of the Board.145 
 
The elimination of producer-retailers, together with the DMB 
marketing drive, went a long way towards helping the Board dispose of its 
surplus milk. Although there is evidence that some Africans, particularly 
those who lived in communal areas which were located close to the urban 
centres, responded to the elimination of producer-retailers by resorting to 
their communal areas for the provision of milk,146 the overall impact was that 
                                                            
140.  The Rhodesian Herald,18 September,1965. 
141.  The DMB constantly accused producer-retailers of selling “unhealthy milk” to the 
public. The phrase was widely used in a quarterly DMB publication entitled “The 
Dairy Go Around”. 
142.  NAZ, S/DA57, DMB, Annual Report, 1963/1964, p 14. 
143.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1964/1965, p 11. 
144.  NAZ, RG2, Parliamentary Select Committee, 1969, p 9. 
145.  NAZ, S/DA, 57 DMB, Annual Report, 1979/1980, p 7. 
146.  Consumers were by no means passive in their responses to policy makers. Some 
African urban dwellers whose residences were close to their rural communities 
were known to rely on supplies from their relatives back in the communal areas. 
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they turned to the Board’s products. Deprived of the services of producer-
retailers, consumers were forced to turn to DMB products for dairy products. 
Indeed, the sale of whole milk and especially, creamed “lacto” in African 
areas was continually on the increase throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
During 1968/1969, for instance, total whole milk consumption in Africa areas 
increased by 10 percent, while “lacto” sales increased by 24 percent in 
comparison to the previous year’s sales figures.147 Even more impressive 
were the 1969/1970 figures when whole milk sales in the African sector rose 
by some 39 percent at a time when European consumption fell by 6 
percent.148 Even the general price increases that were effected on most 
dairy products did not significantly reduce the sales figures. Although the 
retail price of whole milk and lacto was increased from 8 cents to 9 cents per 
pint and from 7 cents to 8 cents per pint respectively in February 1973, 
sales increased by 9.5 percent over the previous year with the African 
market increasing by an impressive 21.1 percent.149 
 
With reference to the close link between increasing sales and the 
Board’s healthy financial status, W. Margolis reported at the end of the 
1969/1970 financial year: 
 
Overall, it has been a year of expansion in the marketing realm, with turnover 
rising from approximately $10.8 million during 1968/1969 to nearly $11.7 
million this year. Total whole milk sales increased by nearly 10 percent and 
in fact, the rate of increase in whole milk sales was proportionately greater 
than the rate of increase in intake so that the overall ratio of whole milk sales 
to total deliveries improved.150 
 
As sales continued to increase, the Board’s turnover continued to 
increase, reaching $14.7 million in 1971/1972 before peaking at $16.8 
million the following year.151 While part of this increase in turnover may be 
attributable to the fact that unlike in previous years, the government 
consistently increased the retail prices of all dairy products to economic 
levels, no more than one-fifth of the increase in turnover could be accounted 
for by the price increases for any one financial year.152 
 
From the foregoing it can be observed that the Board, on the eve of 
independence in 1980, had established itself as a de-facto monopoly. This 
is despite the fact that the DMB was not initially established as a commercial 
enterprise, least of all a monopolistic one. This was despite the loud calls of 
disapproval from its competitors and other independent quarters. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See G. Hove, “Creating Order and Stability? The Development of Settler Dairy 
Farming under the Dairy Marketing Board, 1952–1980”, MA dissertation, University 
of Zimbabwe, 2010. 
147.   NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1968/1967, p 10. 
148.   NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1969/1970, p 12. 
149.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1972/1973, p 8. 
150.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1969/1970, p 12. 
151.  NAZ, GEN/DA-P, “Dairy Marketing Board: Dairy Products in Rhodesia”, Salisbury 
Spectrum, 1974. 
152.  NAZ, S/DA 57, DMB, Annual Report, 1979/1980, p 8. 
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conclusion, it may be useful to quote the 1961 Commission’s view on the 
issue. It concluded that: 
 
Subject to health safeguards being put in place, these vendors [the producer-
retailers] have a useful part to play in an industry, the distribution of whose 
main product is entrusted to a public enterprise. Producer-retailers render a 
service which a section of the public wants and help to keep the DMB on its 
toes. Nor should consumers be deprived of a service they demand.153 
 
In this light, therefore there is a case to make the contention that the 
establishment of the DMB as a de-facto monopoly where private enterprise 
was only welcome only in cases where it acted as a customer to the 
organisation was in the interests of neither the producer nor the consumers. 
Also, there is ample room to contend that this scenario allowed the Board to 
develop an attitude of complacency. This being so, as late as 1988 it was 
one of the statutory bodies whose general efficiency was under the 
spotlight.154 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has shown that from the time the DMB was established in 1952, 
the fortunes of the dairy industry immediately began to improve. With 
confidence among farmers buoyed by a guaranteed market and high 
producer prices, shortages of milk and other dairy products, which had been 
a stubborn feature since the beginning of the Second World War began to 
disappear, so much so that by 1954, a surplus was recorded. Production 
figures soared and by the 1960s they had more than doubled. Buoyed by 
the post-war economic boom and the steadily rising population, the first four 
years following the Board’s formation were prosperous for both the farmer 
and the Board. 
 
However, as both the post war economic boom and European 
population growth began to slacken from the mid 1950s, the boom slowly 
gave way to a crisis. Overproduction set in. The conversion of surplus milk 
into cheese, butter and other products proved to be unsustainable because 
these products were less lucrative in comparison to milk. It was in this 
context that the Board made relentless efforts to find outlets for the more 
rewarding liquid milk trade. This article puts forward the argument that the 
Board’s shift in focus towards the burgeoning African urban population, 
together with the use of state legislative power to elbow out competing 
producer-retailers on the milk market should be viewed in this context. 
Indeed, while the industry almost exclusively depended on the European 
population for a domestic market from the early days of colonial occupation, 
by the 1970s, it had successfully shifted its focus to the huge African market 
that existed in urban areas. Similarly, by the 1970s, the Board had 
                                                            
153.  NAZ, FG 4, Report of the Committee of Inquiry, 1961, p 9. 
154.  The performance of most parastatals in Zimbabwe came under the spotlight in 
1988. It was alleged by some economic analysts that because most of them are 
monopolies they are offering poor services. For instance, see NAZ, ZG4, DMB, 
Committee of Parastatals, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Parastatals 
under the chairmanship of L.G. Smith, 1988. 
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established itself as a behemoth which crushed whatever competition 
existed on the milk market. More than for any other reason, such moves 
were taken to keep the Board’s financial nostrils above the turbulent 
economic waters of the 1960s and 1970s, and the rapidly changing 
demographic structure of the colony. 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the efforts of the Dairy Marketing Board (DMB) in 
stabilising the dairy industry in the wake of difficulties that emerged in the 
production and marketing of dairy products after World War Two. It traces 
and evaluates the marketing and distribution strategies the DMB used, and 
their strengths and weaknesses. It illustrates the point that while shortages 
which had characterised war-time and post-war Southern Rhodesia had 
been eliminated by the mid 1950s, continued increased production led to 
over production which in turn created serious challenges for the Board in 
finding markets for the lucrative liquid milk trade. This article analyses the 
general national policy of self sufficiency in agricultural production that was 
espoused during the course of the war and were pursued vigorously after 
the war. It argues that this policy was not feasible for the dairy sector 
because it proved cheaper to import cheese and skimmed milk powder than 
to produce it locally. It is also maintains that while the voluntary takeover 
and recapitalisation of struggling private concerns on the distribution side 
was necessary in the 1950s, the employment of legislative instruments to 
elbow private concerns out of the milk market from the 1960s onwards was 
not in the best interests of the industry. Instead, these tactics were aimed at 
placating the DMB financially – a move that was unfair to both private 
players and consumers. 
 
Key words: Dairy Marketing Board, Dairy Farmers, Marketing, Production, 
Producer-Retailers, Milk 
 
Opsomming 
 
Hierdie artikel ondersoek die pogings van die Suiwel Bemarkingsraad (Dairy 
Marketing Board [DMB]) om, in die lig van die produksie en bemarkings 
probleme wat in die vaarwater van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog ervaar is, die 
suiwelbedryf te stabiliseer. Dit ondersoek en evalueer die sterk en 
swakpunte van die bemarkings en verspreidings strategieë wat die Raad 
gebruik het. Die artikel argumenteer dat hoewel die tekorte wat tydens en 
direk na die oorlog in Suid-Rhodesiё ondervind is teen die middel 
vyftigerjare uitgeskakel is, die voortgesette toename in produksie tot 
oorproduksie gelei het.  Hierdie oorproduksie het die Raad genoodsaak om 
nuwe markte vir die winsgewende handel in vloeibare melk te vind. Hierdie 
studie analiseer die algemene nasionale beleid van selfvoorsienendheid ten 
opsigte van landbouproduksie wat tydens die oorlog beslag gekry het en na 
die oorlog doelgerig nagestreef is. Die referaat argumenteer dat die beleid 
in die lig van die beskikbaarheid van goedkoper ingevoerde kaas en 
afgeroomde poeiermelk, nie vir die suiwelbedryf haalbaar was nie. Dit word 
ook geargumenteer dat terwyl die vrywillige oorname en die 
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herkapitalisering van sukkelende privaat verspreiders van suiwelprodukte 
noodsaaklik was in die 1950’s, die aanwending van wetgewing in die 1960’s 
om privaat produsente uit die melkmark te dryf nie in die bedryf se beste 
belang was nie. Die taktiek wat daarop gemik was om die Raad finansieel 
ter wille te wees was onregverdig teenoor beide die privaat rolspelers as die 
verbruikers. 
 
Sleutelwoorde: Suiwel Bemarkingraad; Suiwelboere, Bemarking, 
Produksie, Produsent-kleinhandelaars, Melk. 
 
